A Normative Framework of Justice in Climate Change by Marco Grasso
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS




WORKING PAPER SERIES 
 
 
A Normative Framework of Justice 














Dipartimento di Economia Politica 




A normative framework of justice  




Dipartimento di Sociologia e Ricerca Sociale 






The more the various dimensions of climate change are just, the more an 
international agreement is in principle attainable. That is the reason why justice 
plays a major role in favouring collective action against global warming. In this 
article I spell out the dominant notions of justice and the consequent criteria of 
equity for the main domains of global warming negotiations, in order to identify a 
normative ethical framework. As far as mitigation is concerned, for the definition 
of a just initial allocation of endowments the reference point should be a per capita 
distribution corrected by a factor which takes into account all undeserved 
inequalities, as suggested by Rawls’ theory of justice. With regard to the 
subsequent exchange of endowments, I consider the Pareto principle supplemented 
by the envy-freeness one as the most viable option. Turning to adaptation, my point 
is that the criterion of responsibility based on historical accountability is inevitable. 
The related underpinning of justice can be found in principle I of Rawls’ theory of 
justice. Finally, for the issues raised by the just allocation of compensations for 
climate related damages I consider Sen’s capability approach the soundest option. 
Keywords: adaptation, climate change, equity, justice, international climate 
agreements, mitigation 
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1. Facing climate change 
Climate variations, which are essentially irreversible, are supposed to have a number of 
impacts on our lives and our ecosystems. For instance: reduced productivity of 
resources, damage to human-built environments, risk to health and life, damage to ‘less 
managed resources’ such as wilderness and biodiversity. The current literature agrees on 
the conclusion that expected burdens will be heavier for poorer countries
1 (IPCC, 
2001b, pp. 6, 8, Grubb, 1995, p. 467), which are more vulnerable because of their 
greater dependence on agriculture, lack of financial resources, technology and 
institutional capacity. The poverty-related global warming effects include reduction in 
crop yields affecting food security, employment, incomes and economic growth, 
displacement of people from coastal area, exposure to new health risks, increase in the 
frequency and severity of extreme climatic events. Therefore, such an exceedingly 
unbalanced distribution of negative impacts is going to widen even more the gap 
between the North and the South, confirming the view of climate change as essentially a 
matter of justice. 
1.1 Problems 
The scientific evidence has demonstrated that the atmosphere cannot continue to absorb 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions at the rate of the latest years. Its indiscriminate use by 
one party produces an overexploitation that can eventually harm other parties. The 
atmosphere is in fact a life-supporting common which operates as a collector of man-
made emissions. In a social sciences perspective it is a global public good
2: 
 
 “In many ways, global warming is the quintessential global pure public 
good, because each country’s release of GHG augments the world’s 
atmospheric stock in an additive fashion and each country’s cutback results 
in a greater cost than benefit for that country unless assurances can be 
given that a sufficient number of action will act” (Sandler, 1998, p. 225). 
 
The two main characteristics of public goods are: non-excludability (i.e. it is impossible 
to prevent everyone from enjoying the benefits deriving from the consumption of the 
good) and non-rivalry (i.e. the consumption of the good from one person does not 
undermine another’s consumption). Global public goods have also a third dimension: 
they provide globally available benefits unconstrained by national boundaries. These 
elements may eventually provoke a policy failure, inducing some countries not to 
participate (or to participate in a limited way) in the provision of goods themselves. This 
failure is ascribable to a series of problems in public behaviour, such as the prisoner’s 
dilemma and free riding. According to the former, the provision of a global public good, 
though in everyone’s interest, remains unsatisfactory because it is unclear both how the 
associated collective actions should take place, and who should coordinate them. And 
without shared information and cooperation, is very unlikely to reach en efficient and 
                                                  
1 According to Richards (2003, p. 5, note 1): “Between 1990 and 1998, 94% of 568 major natural disasters, and 97% 
of all disaster-related deaths have taken place in developing countries. Another study has found that 35-40% of the 
worst catastrophes have been climate change related”. 
2 Specifically, global climate stability is a global public good, and global warming is the corresponding global public 
“bad”.   3
fair allocation of the services delivered by the public good. The latter problem of free-
riding occurs when some parties benefit from the public good (because of its non-
excludability) without participating in its provision. Hence there is a strong incentive for 
everyone to escape facing its cost, waiting for others to take initiative. 
1.2 Strategies 
The voluntary based consent implied by the Westphalian principle, stating that 
obligations may be imposed on a sovereign state only with its consent, suggests that no 
supranational institution can, unilaterally and legitimately, adopt any climate treaty and 
bind states to comply with it: such a treaty can depend only on voluntary agreements
3. 
Furthermore, appeals to global economic efficiency alone are not sufficient to rally 
countries together, given the wide disparities in their well-being implied by mitigation 
policies, different vulnerability levels, and diversified costs of adaptation to climate 
change impacts. At the same time, there is widespread consensus on the fact that greater 
cooperation is likely if the climate agreement is perceived to be fair both in its process 
and in its outcomes
4 (Shue, 1992). Inevitably, then, justice plays a major role as a 
unifying principle to facilitate collective actions against global warming: the more 
climate negotiations are informed by justice, the more the participants and the more a 
global manageable solution can in principle be achieved. 
There are basically two main strategies to deal with climate change: mitigation and 
adaptation. Mitigation is defined as “an anthropogenic intervention to reduce the 
sources of greenhouse gases or enhance their sinks” (IPCC, 2001c, p. 3), in order to 
reduce their concentration in the atmosphere. Adaptation relies on the development of 
adaptive capacities for vulnerable natural and human systems, in order to resist physical 
effects due to climate variability. These two routes obviously reinforce one another: 
“Adaptation is a necessary strategy at all scales to complement climate change 
mitigation efforts” (IPCC, 2001a, p. 23). 
The chances that the adverse effects of global warming will take place are rather poorly 
understood and the ensuing socio-economic outcomes are even less foreseeable. GHG 
have a long persistence in the atmosphere, climate variability has global impacts 
potentially harmful and unpredictable, and the distributions of costs and benefits are not 
completely known. Therefore, each country has different interests and objectives, and 
different perspectives on policy options. At the same time the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which requires that all countries enter the 
international policy arena (“meaningful participation”) with a role proportionate to the 
respective responsibilities (“common but differentiated responsibilities”), implies that 
all these different claims do not hinder collective actions against global warming. 
However, since no global institution enforcing an international climate agreement does 
exist, the deal should be self-enforcing. In turn a self-enforcing commitment is in 
                                                  
3 This point is partly questioned by the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment (1972), which at principle 
21 reads: “States have the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other states”. 
4 Carraro and Bruchner (2002, p. 10) conclude, on the contrary, that cost-effectiveness is more useful than fairness in 
inducing more countries to enter an international climate coalition. However this conclusion holds only with regard to 
the outcomes of the mitigation process for the three chosen equity criteria (equal average abatement costs, equal per 
capita abatement costs, equal abatement costs per unit of GDP), and within the limits defined by the RICE model of 
simulation.   4
general more likely when the risk is clear and present, when the stakes are relatively 
small and when the incentives for free-riding are negligible. This is not, regrettably, the 
case of global climate change. Consequently any such agreement should be widely 
shared, a condition which is certainly favoured when the agreement itself is informed by 
principles of justice and shaped by criteria of equity. In fact, justice and equity imply 
greater legitimacy and can persuade parties with conflicting interests to better cooperate 
in collective actions. Hence sticking to principles of justice and criteria of equity is the 
straightest, if not the only, way to effectively address the “common but differentiated 
responsibilities” demanded by the UNFCCC. 
2 Sharing climate burden: elements of a just puzzle 
Justice concerns are rooted in a fundamental difference in the balance of power and in 
the perception of climate change among developed and developing countries. Power, as 
a result of natural and historical processes, is unevenly distributed in favour of rich 
countries, which can in principle use their superior influence in framing convenient 
international treaties. Furthermore, in the industrialized North
5 there is an ecological 
view of the effects of rising temperatures, and hence climate change is seen basically as 
a problem of threatening the environment. Accordingly, environmental effectiveness is 
a key criterion in the assessment of measures against global warming. In the South, on 
the contrary, climate change is primarily perceived as an issue mostly affecting human 
well-being: the harm is against humans, who have to suffer the physical impacts 
generated primarily by others, namely the industrialized North. Therefore, the usual 
North’s conception of justice as the sharing of mitigation costs in the name of a general 
principle of responsibility is at least incomplete. It must be supplemented by the South’s 
one, which is essentially focused on the disproportion between the responsibility for and 
the efforts of adaptation to burdens imposed by global warming impacts. 
2.1 What is to be distributed? 
In the climate debate the term justice is often used interchangeably with equity and 
fairness
6. However, even though these notions are undisputedly interconnected and 
complementary, principles of justice, alone or articulated in composite theories of 
justice, exist independently before any process of judgement. Equity refers to normative 
criteria for orienting the implementation of principle(s)/theory(s) of justice, whereas 
fairness relies on the individual’s perception emerging after a process of judgement. 
Therefore, what is to be distributed, or more specifically which is lato sensu the burden 
to be shared? In general, environmental justice is a social concept focusing on the 
distribution of environmental benefits, risks and harms among human beings
7. Coming 
to climate change, the sharable burden consists of costs (and benefits) both of mitigation 
efforts for reducing global emissions, and of adaptation attempts for preventing harmful 
effects of global warming. Regrettably, in spite of the evident complementarity of these 
                                                  
5 Not of course geographically intended, rather in terms of wealth and economic development. 
6 See, for instance, Muller (2001, p. 273), Ashton and Wang (2003, p. 1, note 1). This perspective can ultimately be 
ascribed to Adam Smith’s impartial spectator with impartial judgment. 
7 I halt at the level of human beings and of intra-human relationships, accepting the unavoidable charges of 
anthropocentrism and of cultural ‘west-centrism’, in the hope of making the problem more tractable. I nonetheless 
acknowledge the risk of human supremacism, which considers nature just a resource to use indiscriminately and that, 
treating non-human as inferior and replaceable, is intrinsically unjust and potentially destructive.    5
two domains of justice, ascribable to the complementarity of mitigation and adaptation 
strategies for coping with climate change (IPCC, 2001a, p. 23), burden sharing has been 
intended mainly, if not solely, as a problem of mitigation. Mitigation is however one 
side of the justice issue. Adaptation and the consequent compensations form the other. 
Furthermore, it is important to point out that the global public good nature of climate 
stability originates a sort of spatial and temporal asymmetry between actions and their 
external effects (Schukla, 1999, p. 145). Indeed, most of anthropogenetic GHG 
emissions took place in the past decades in developed countries, whereas the largest 
amount of impacts is going to be suffered by poorer countries. In other words, the 
distribution of impacts essentially does not depend on the specific profile of each 
country’s emissions. This circumstance, in my opinion, links indissolubly the two 
dimensions of justice: the sharing of GHG abatement costs and the distribution of costs 
of impacts and of adaptation. The first issue aims at a just minimization of global 
mitigation costs by equalizing the marginal cost of abatement, on the basis of an 
equitable allocation of initial endowments, the rights to use (i.e. to release GHG into) a 
common resource like the atmosphere. The second seeks a perceptible fair distribution 
of the dimensions of adaptation processes, both in terms of financing of prevention 
activities and of compensation of damages. 
2.2 Notions and domains of justice 
When dealing with global warming, it is necessary to consider both distributive and 
procedural notions of justice
 8. At the same time, justice has both spatial (within and 
between countries, the latter declination being our focus) and temporal (between present 
and future generations) notions. The temporal notion - which is out of the reach of this 
article - rests on the fact that while actions against global warming and resulting costs 
are shouldered by the present generation, likely benefits of avoided losses will affect 
both present and future generations. 
I concentrate on distributive international justice between nation states. This does not 
imply that the question of justice can be defined forgetting individuals or local 
communities, that directly face diverse climate impacts and have diverse levels of 
vulnerability, and that therefore are the ultimate subjects of any climate policy. I admit 
that the process of anthropomorphising nations is, to stay with Sen (in Eyckmans and 
Schokkaert, 2003, p. 14), a “fantasie" leading to a distortion of sub- national and inter-
individual issues. Having acknowledged that, I however assume that justice operates 
mainly at the state level. Matter-of-factly, in climate-related justice disputes nation 
states are expected to mediate between supranational interests (e.g. emission 
abatements, adaptation patterns) and the ones of individuals and communities, 
essentially related to the mere distribution of costs and benefits deriving from the 
pursuing of those general interests. Actually, nation states can effectively deal with 
global scale problems on behalf of their citizens, and in this sense justice, although 
referring to individuals and communities, can be synthesized, regulated and eventually 
analysed at the national level
9. 
                                                  
8 Distributive justice concerns the distribution of positive and negative impacts of global warming. Procedural justice 
relates to the level of participation and recognition of all the actors involved in the decisional processes. 
9 Nonetheless, taking into account sub national circumstances remains a crucial issue in a further step of climate 
change studies.   6
International climate justice can be framed in the following domains: 
- just  initial  allocation of endowments, 
-  just exchange of endowments, 
-  just allocation of costs for preventing and managing the impacts of global 
warming, 
-  distribution of wealth and power allowing a just international negotiating 
process. 
 
The first two points deal with the mitigation of GHG emissions and implicate a sharp 
and well-delineated question of distributive justice: it is a matter of proportionality 
according to morally relevant quantifiable attributes. To put it with Aristotle “what is 
just is what is proportional, and what is unjust is what violates the proportion” (in 
Muller, 2001b, p. 273).  
Alas, no agreed solutions exist. Some privilege an initial allocation of emissions rights 
according to past or other, say perspective, levels of emissions. Some, according to a 
libertarian perspective, claim instead rights to the atmosphere as the reference. In this 
latter perspective a just distribution of endowments depends on the entitlement to use 
the atmosphere by virtue of being the first one to do so. Therefore the status quo is the 
reference for emissions, and developed countries hold the right to emit at current level, 
independently of any past or present responsibility. Others look for a path encompassing 
the arbitrary distribution of social, environmental and economic characteristics of 
involved parties. As far as the just redistribution of endowments is concerned, the 
market is by and large considered the best solution to achieve efficient outcomes, and 
justice concerns are usually defended on the basis of welfare economics theorems. 
This controversial situation eventually suggests the urgency to find a just solution, 
grounded on an equitable distribution of initial endowments and in a morally actable 
principle to distribute some homogeneous divisible quantities. However, as already 
pointed out, it is necessary to integrate this partial view of justice and widen its range in 
order to encompass the other domains, namely the distribution of costs (and benefits) of 
adaptation and of damages due to climate change effects. From an operational point of 
view this latter domain of justice, still a distributive one, can be split into two more 
elements: the financing of adaptation activities
10; and the compensation for the damages 
and economic losses caused by climate change, in turn based on two subsequent 
moments, financing and allocation. 
 
Table 1 – Strategy and domains of justice in climate change 
Strategy  Domains of justice 
Initial distribution of endowments  Mitigation 
Exchange of endowments 
Financing of adaptation activities  Adaptation 
Compensation for damages (financing and 
allocation) 
 
                                                  
10 There are not allocative issues here, since adaptation activities are usually financed on a project basis. The selection 
of projects would imply allocative questions, but this point would lead the analysis too far.   7
The first aspect deals with the division among countries of costs of adaptation programs 
and projects. The second issue copes with the raising and the allocation of resources 
available for damage compensation. This last point has very scarcely been considered, 
neither at the theoretical nor at the practical level, but it is very likely going to play a 
fundamental role in the framing of future climate commitments (Paavola and Adger, 
2002; Ringius and Frederiksen, 2002). 
Finally, while the first three domains are focused on the distributional notion of justice, 
the fourth one deals with the procedural one, that is on the equity and fairness of the 
process by which a possible agreement is attainable. A viable climate treaty should 
grant all the parties equal access, and ensure that issues posed by subjects who believe 
to have interests at stake be fairly dealt with. Another, more problematic, aspect of 
procedural justice involves the effective capacity of parties to participate in the 
negotiation processes. Actually, climate negotiations are extremely complex, and 
therefore only richer countries can usually afford platoons of skilled negotiators, while 
poor parties send to the battlefield few if not only one negotiator. Matter-of-factly most 
of the climate change debate is carried out among institutions, scholars and activists 
from the richest industrialized countries (and from oil countries, in the latest year), 
whereas procedural justice would require assuring equal opportunities to all involved 
parties to protect their own interests. 
In what follows I focus on the distributive aspects of justice, because the aim of this 
article is that of setting a normative framework for justice and equity issues in 
mitigation and adaptation domains. Therefore procedural justice is out of the picture. 
Nonetheless I acknowledge the all important role that it is going to play in future 
climate change negotiations. 
3. In need of a comprehensive normative framework of justice 
Political philosophy devotes many efforts to the exploration of issues of justice. 
Specifically, it has delivered a number of theories of justice, intended as a set of 
principles for guiding public judgement in addressing and organizing the various 
aspects of justice
11.  
The main philosophical approaches that lay behind the debate on justice can be 
generally framed in four theoretical families. The first one is focused on the observation 
of consequences and end states and can be paradigmatically represented by 
utilitarianism and welfare economics. The second category is based on individual 
responsibility and proportionality: Nozick’s entitlement theory is the epitome of this 
libertarian perspective. The third one is centred on equality, needs, opportunities and 
freedom and reveals a general concern for the least well-of members of society. Rawls’ 
social contract theory and Sen’s capability approach
12 are probably the most significant 
examples of liberal theories of justice. Finally, there is a group of theories stressing the 
                                                  
11 In these theories equality and liberty are often the most important issues dealt with. Non-surprisingly, the main 
difference among them is to be seen in the way in which they articulate and balance equality and liberty. 
12 Even if, according to Sen (1999), the capability approach simply specifies an evaluative space and therefore it 
cannot be considered a complete theory of justice. Rather, it is an important constituent for a new general theory of 
justice, and this is the reason why I consider it important in the climate debate on justice.   8
importance of considering the notion of justice as context related
13, which I do not 
consider appropriate when dealing with global public goods and supranational issues
14. 
The point of this paper is neither to analyse the various families and theories of justice, 
nor to formulate an exhaustive theory of justice. Rather, I intend to spell out the 
dominant dimensions of justice and equity with respect to the specificity of global 
warming, in order to identify a comprehensive normative framework for climate-related 
justice. 
The domains of justice of table 1, in my opinion, can be framed according to the 
theories of justice and consequents conceptions of equity put forward in table 2. 
 
Table 2 – Strategies, domains, theories of justice (TJ) and criteria of equity in climate 
change 
Strategy  Domains of justice  Theory of justice  Criteria of Equity 
Initial distribution of 
endowments 
Rawls’ TJ 
I & II principles 
Differentiated equality 
(on the basis of 
unjustified inequalities)  Mitigation 





Financing of adaptation 
activities 
Rawls’ TJ  
I principle 
Responsibility 
(based on historical 
accountability) 
Financing  Rawls’ TJ  
I principle 
Responsibility 




damages  Allocation  Sen’s TJ 
Capability approach 
Capability lack  
(in the space of 
functionings) 
 
Global problems need global solutions. Global climate solutions in turn have to gain the 
consensus of the largest number of sovereign parties, which are more prone to enter an 
international agreement when it is perceived as fair. Hence the more the various 
dimensions of climate change (the domains of tables 1 and 2) are just, equitable and 
perceived as fair, the more a climate agreement is attainable, even if the grounds for 
consensus diverge among actors. It is in fact the existence of a comprehensive ethical 
framework that can make a climate agreement acceptable in spite of the great variability 
of climatic outcomes. That is the reason why justice plays a major role as a unifying 
principle to facilitate collective actions against global warming. 
                                                  
13 Some authors attack from particular perspectives, such as the feminist or the communitarian ones, the abstractness - 
Rawls himself describes his theory of justice with an oxymoron as “realistically utopian” - of general theories of 
justice, proposing alternative, more concrete and contextualized approaches. On this ground these critics are 
increasingly questioning the universalism of liberal theories of justice. 
14At least at this general level. Indeed, when entering into the details of an operational framework of justice, they can 
prove very useful to deal with particularisms.    9
3.2 Justice in mitigation 
The issue of justice in mitigation can be seen as a problem of defining a just initial 
allocation of endowments and equitable consequent exchange patterns. The first point 
has generated a notable debate and a vast literature, which I am not going to review. The 
second one has been so far underestimated, attributing to the market the role of ensuring 
efficient transactions of emissions rights, in the name of the second theorem of applied 
welfare economics which intends markets as means to reach any desired distribution of 
resources potentially purported by initial allocations. 
I intend, conversely, to highlight separately the notions of justice and the consequent 
criteria of equity that can provide a common and ethically justifiable ground for GHG 
control processes. 
3.2.1 Distribution of initial endowments 
As far as the distribution of initial endowments is concerned, in the climate change 
theoretical literature an equal per capita distribution of entitlements is generally 
considered the most just, equitable and fair alternative (IPCC, 1996, p. 106). 
Unfortunately, it is by no means the most viable, being rather quite unfeasible. Actually, 
it would result in the largest ever wealth transfer from developed to developing 
countries
15 (Panayotou et al., 2002, p. 440), and therefore it would be harshly opposed 
by rich and influential countries. Realistically, an agreement incorporating such a 
criterion has no chance to succeed. 
I alternatively propose an ethical framework based on Rawls’ theory of justice (RTJ). 
RTJ intends justice as fairness, and is based on two principles of justice which guide 
equal, free, mutually disinterested, rational individuals in their judgments about their 
social contract and their economic and social arrangements. The first - the egalitarian 
principle - states that every individual has the same right to the most extensive system 
of equal basic personal and political liberties, rights and duties, compatible with a 
similar system for all. The second - the difference principle - holds that inequalities are 
tolerable only if they satisfy two conditions. First, legitimate inequalities can 
characterize only situations open to all, under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. 
Second, inequalities must be to the greatest benefit for the least advantaged members of 
society
16. In brief, “An injustice is tolerable only when it is necessary to avoid en even 
greater injustice” (Rawls, 1971, p. 4). 
These principles form the basic structure of societies, insofar they: 
 
“are to regulate all further agreements; they specify the kinds of social 
cooperation that can be entered into and the forms of government that can 
be established. This way of regarding the principles of justice I shall call 
justice as fairness.” (Rawls, 1971, p. 11). 
 
                                                  
15 According to Aldy et al. (2001) this criterion would also generate other problems. The emission limit would not be 
binding for developing countries for a long time; the allocation scheme could foster population growth; it would give 
a large share of the permits to a very limited number of countries (38% to China and India); finally, it would not 
consider the circumstances of different countries. 
16 These principles are integrated by rules of priority, both between the principles themselves (the priority of liberty) 
and within the second one (the priority of justice over efficiency and welfare).   10
In particular, the difference principle requires a socio-economic system that lessens 
illegitimated and undeserved inequalities. Put slightly differently, it holds that 
inequalities owing to differences in contingencies of social and natural fortune be 
minimized. Eventually, the two principles say that (principle I) in order to assure to any 
individual a real equality of opportunity, (principle II) society must pay more attention 
to those whose life is more affected by “arbitrariness of natural contingency and social 
fortune” (Rawls, 1971, p. 96), i.e. to people with fewer assets and born in 
disadvantageous positions. Rawls seems hence to refer explicitly to “the old and 
relatively uncontroversial Aristotelian notion of treating equals equally, in strict 
accordance with the rules, to ground a theory of justice which allows considerable 
discrepancies in equality.” (Cullen, 1992, p. 19). 
Furthermore, Rawls points out that each and every individual “possesses an inviolability 
founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override” (Rawls: 
1971, p. 3). Therefore a central point of the difference principle is the definition of the 
notion of this inviolability in terms of advantages. Being advantaged is basically 
determined by the availability of primary goods and services. Each individual is in fact 
entitled to a certain minimum level of basic goods and services such as food, clothing, 
shelter, social services, health, education, income. In my opinion, in current societies 
emerges vigorously another fundamental basic need: energy requirement, that is the 
availability of energy services. 
My essential idea is that each individual entails at least a certain level of energy 
services, which are influenced by ‘undeserved inequalities’ such as different climatic 
conditions. At the same time, not all energy services produce GHG emissions: not the 
ones met by renewables, for instance. Furthermore, some countries might have higher 
capacity of absorbing GHG emissions, because they have vast forested areas. The 
uneven distribution of these characteristics eventually jeopardizes the way people can 
reach a genuine equality of opportunity, at least as far as the access to these energy 
services is concerned, as prospected by principle I of RTJ. 
Hence, to ground the initial distribution of endowments in (principles I and II of) RTJ it 
is necessary to develop an equity criterion encompassing all the elements determining 
the fruition of the flow of energy services, with respect to the consequent GHG 
emissions. I name it the criterion of ‘differentiated equality’. It suggests that, according 
to the egalitarian principle, the reference point must be an equal per capita distribution 
of endowments. On the basis of the difference principle, and of the “arbitrariness of 
natural contingency and social fortune” it encapsulates, undeserved inequalities, such as 
the ones in energy needs due to weather conditions, availability of renewables and of 
sinks, should be reduced. Ultimately, the equal per capita distribution of endowments 
put forward by principle I must be corrected by a factor which takes into account all 
these different elements influencing the demand for GHG emitting energy services, as 
required by principle II. 
3.2.2 Exchange of endowments 
There is widespread evidence that the negotiation of carbon endowments among 
countries would benefit all participating countries and would make possible more 
stringent emissions cutbacks in the future (Bohm, 2000). This is due to the fact that 
marginal costs of emissions abatement differ greatly among countries. Therefore the 
search for efficiency calls for a redistribution of emission rights equalizing different   11
marginal costs. In economic terms the outcomes of such an efficient redistribution are 
considered to be Pareto-optimal social states, in the sense that there are not other social 
states that can make someone better off without making at the same time someone else 
worse off.  
Pareto optimality is the core of new welfare economics, which in turn upholds that 
choices, according to act utilitarianism, are evaluated only in terms of their 
consequences on social welfare, which hence depends solely on individual utility
17. 
Utilitarianism, in the wake of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, David Hume and 
Adam Smith, considers as the sole axiom for morality the principle of utility, or the 
‘greatest happiness principle’, stating that societies must pursue the greatest happiness 
for the greatest number. Utilitarianism is a consequentialist doctrine, insofar the 
rightness of conduct depends solely on the goodness of outcomes. The Pareto principle 
overtakes the strong cardinality and comparability assumptions of utilitarianism, 
endorsing the much weaker value judgment mentioned above. Unfortunately Pareto-
optimality ignores justice issues. In fact different states can be Pareto-optimal and still 
highly unjust: “If preventing the burning of Rome have made emperor Nero feel worse 
off, then letting him burn Rome would have been Pareto-optimal. In short a society or 
an economy can be Pareto-optimal and still be perfectly disgusting” (Sen, 1970, p. 22). 
Hence the Pareto principle by itself will necessary lead to the defence of the status quo. 
Nor even the Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle is sufficient to make it include 
justice issues. 
Therefore the Pareto principle, though necessary for maximizing the wealth to be 
eventually (justly) redistributed, must be supported by some criterion of distributive 
justice. I state this in spite of the fact that I consider an initial allocation of endowments 
based on Rawls’ TJ and on the differentiated equality criterion just. And consequently, 
according to the second theorem of applied welfare economics, I acknowledge that a 
number of potentially just final Pareto-efficient redistributions of emission rights could 
be achieved through market mechanism. This nonetheless holds only in a first-best 
world, with lump sum redistribution. Alas, climate change negotiations do not take 
place on perfectly competitive markets, nor does exist any international body disposing 
of lump sum redistributive instruments. 
Abandoning the theoretical first world heaven, I consider the envy-freeness criterion as 
a way to choose between different Pareto-optima, thereby identifying allocations that 
are at the same time efficient and equitable: “To a significant extent, envy-freeness has 
become the first and foremost ‘distributive companion’ of the aggregative requirements 
of Pareto efficiency in the literature of normative economics” (Arnsperger, 1994, p. 
155). The absence of envy criterion is the foundation of the quintessential economic TJ, 
known as the theory of fairness (or of equity). In its simplest form an allocation is envy-
free if no agent prefers the bundle of commodities of another. Here individuals envy 
other’s consumption bundle, and not other’s utility, therefore this criterion does not 
involve interpersonal comparison of utility and does not provide a complete ordering of 
social states, avoiding the Arrow impossibility theorem without an enlargement of the 
informational basis. 
As far as GHG emission rights are concerned, Pareto-efficiency and envy-freeness 
require the possibility of compensation payments to favour the division of a global 
                                                  
17 Amartya Sen defines this approach welfarism.   12
public good such as (the right to discharge into) the atmosphere. Specifically, the Pareto 
principle suggests that subsequent redistributions allocate emissions rights where the 
marginal cost of abatement is lower (generally in countries of the South), till the 
equalization of marginal abatement costs across emitters. Simultaneously, envy freeness 
states that Southern countries be compensated
18 by countries with lower initial cutbacks 
(typically from the North, where marginal abatement cost is higher) for their 
proportionally larger share of emission cutbacks, in order to prevent any party 
preferring resulting allocations of endowments and compensation payments of the 
others, provided that the new efficient allocations can give every party at least the utility 
implied by the just original one, and no more utility than the one achievable if there 
were only one party
19. 
3.3 Justice in adaptation 
The higher vulnerability of the South and the much larger share of past and current 
GHG emissions of the North make the financing of adaptation activities and the 
compensation for climate damages major elements of disagreement between developed 
and developing countries. These topics should therefore be resolved and put at the 
centre of the stage in order to favour fair and effective climate negotiations.  
3.3.1 Financing of adaptation activities 
Who should pay for activities put forward in order to avoid the negative impacts of 
global warming? The polluter-pays-principle says that the ones who have caused the 
problem are to be held responsible. Accordingly, I assume that as far as financing of 
adaptation activities is concerned, responsibility based on historical accountability is 
inevitable. Since climate systems are far too complex to clearly figure out harmed and 
benefited parties, not to say the dimensions of harms and benefits, it seems to me that 
the most equitable criterion to make polluters pay is to render their contributions to 
adaptation activities proportional to their responsibility resulting from historical 
accountability as measured by past emissions, which are fairly measurable figures. 
My point is that in this way it is possible to directly link past emissions of polluters and 
their contribution to GHG concentration in the atmosphere to specific actions 
expressing the willingness to support development efforts of most threatened and ‘no 
guilty’ countries. 
The justice principle backing responsibility based on historical accountability is, again, 
principle I of RTJ, the egalitarian one, whose ultimate goal is to assure to any individual 
a real equality of opportunity. Actually, the atmosphere, its absorptive capacity of man-
made emissions, is a global public good and the rights to it belong to all actual and 
potential human beings around the world. All individuals should therefore be assured a 
certain just amount of endowments. For this amount of endowments to be just to any 
individual, it is necessary to account for past emissions in order to offer equality of 
opportunity to everybody, irrespectively from where and when she happens, happened 
or will happen to live. Otherwise, ignoring historical accountability would imply 
                                                  
18 Compensation is intended as the use of a private resource like money for making compensatory payments, in order 
to attain a just division of a common property resource like the atmosphere. 
19 These are sometimes known as separated criteria, respectively the criterion of individual rationality, and the stand-
alone one. I prefer to acknowledge them as precautionary bounds, respectively the lowest and the highest, for the 
distributions envisaged by Pareto-efficiency and envy-freeness.   13
favouring people who lived in the past in heavy emitters rich countries, and to 
discriminate against the ones who live now in low emitters developing countries, and, 
furthermore, against future generations. A normative criterion such as the responsibility 
based on historical accountability is more likely to be accepted by the reluctant North, 
the major responsible for actual GHG concentration, when rooted in a sound 
philosophical framework as the one offered by RTJ. 
3.3.2 Compensation for damages 
The compensation for damages can be usefully split into two connected but subsequent 
issues. The first deals with the sharing of the shouldering of costs of climate change 
impacts. The second copes with the allocation of the resources raised among harmed 
countries. 
As far as the first point is concerned, I consider principle I of RTJ and the criterion of 
responsibility based on historical accountability as the justice and equity references. The 
problem is in fact by and large very likely to the one faced in financing adaptation 
activities. 
Rather the challenges posed by the allocation of compensation payments are more 
subtle. Intuitively, the most appealing benchmark for grounding the allocation of 
compensations for damages seems to refer to the notion of vulnerability as spelled by 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). According to the IPCC, 
vulnerability “is the degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with, 
adverse effects of climate change” (IPCC 2001b, p. 6). Unfortunately the measure of 
vulnerability of specific countries, or even regions, is subject to substantial uncertainties 
due to many factors that are difficult to incorporate adequately into the analyses. 
Therefore any resulting rankings based on vulnerability cannot be an uncontroversial 
reference for the allocation of compensations for damages. Once more, justice 
principles and equity criteria can represent the basis for setting a more agreed allocation 
of compensations.  
From a theoretical point of view the most agreed notion of justice in the (limited) debate 
about damages compensation seems to be the egalitarian one, grounded in the 
recognition of the sovereignty of all nations. This approach would provide an egalitarian 
solution through the allocation of an equal amount of per capita resources to all eligible 
harmed countries. In my opinion the egalitarian principle patently violates principle II 
of RTJ, and therefore I do not consider it justifiable according to an ethical perspective. 
Rather, I deem more promising Amartya Sen’s capability approach.  
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Table 3 - Principles of justice and implications in the allocation of damage 
compensation 
Principle of justice  Implications 
Equality Equal  amount  per capita to be distributed to all harmed 
countries 
Sen TJ - Capability approach  The more a country/region lacks some achieved 
functionings, the more damage compensation it 
receives 
 
I refer to the capability approach primarily as a method for making comparisons of well-
being
20, that prove ethically sound enough to ground the allocation of damage 
compensations. In brief, this approach requires “a broader informational base, focusing 
particularly on people’s capability to choose the life they have reason to value” 
(Sen,1999, p. 63), to highlight the social and economic factors which give people the 
opportunity to do and to be what they consider valuable. Thus the capability approach 
concentrates directly on the substantive freedoms of individuals involved. In this sense, 
Sen suggests that well-being be considered in terms of functionings and capabilities. 
Functionings relate to what a person may value doing or being: they are the living 
conditions achieved by an individual and represent a set of interrelated activities and 
states (‘doings’ and ‘beings’) that form her life. Capabilities concern the ability of an 
individual to achieve different combinations of functionings, and define the freedom to 
choose the life that she prefers. These two categories are complementary but however 
distinct: 
 
“A functioning is an achievement, whereas a capability is the ability to 
achieve. Functionings are, in a sense, more directly related to living 
conditions, since they are different aspects of living conditions. 
Capabilities, in contrast, are notions of freedom, in the positive sense: what 
real opportunities you have regarding the life you may lead” (Sen, 1987, p. 
36). 
 
Thus well-being in this perspective deals with the enlargement of individuals’ 
substantive freedoms: capabilities. Nonetheless in order to use the capability approach 
as a justice reference in the climate debate I introduce a major simplification. I in fact 
refer to the chosen vector of functionings as the proper normative criterion for ranking 
harmed countries
21. Ultimately my conclusion is that the allocation of damage 
compensations be done with regard to the level of some properly selected achieved 
functionings: the less the overall level of these achieved functionings, the more, 
proportionally, damage compensations are due. 
                                                  
20Indeed, in Sen’s intention it has a far wider significance: it is first of all a framework of thought, which aims to 
highlight the drawbacks of other approaches in identifying and defining well-being and human development. Since 
Sen’s interest seems to be mainly concerned with this foundational level, he has never provided a formula or path to 
carry out welfare and development measurements and comparisons  
21 Sen himself suggests that at a practical level the most appropriate focus of attention should not always lie in the 
measure of capabilities: “Some capabilities are harder to measure than others and attempts to putting them on a 
‘metric’ may sometimes hide more than they reveal” (Sen, 1999: 81).   15
At a first glance this perspective seems very similar to the one prospected by RTJ, 
especially to the focus on the least well off put forward by principle II. In the end both 
in fact suggest to pay more attention to the most disadvantaged parties. Actually there is 
a sharp distinction between these two notions of justice. It lies in the different 
informational base they rely on, the “focal personal features” (Sen, 1990, p. 112). The 
ones of the Senian TJ are substantive freedoms, while the ones of RTJ are primary 
goods. According to Sen the ability of converting these primary goods into freedoms 
varies for individual, social, institutional reasons, and thus equality of primary goods 
can produce harsh inequalities in the level of enjoyed freedoms. In other words primary 
goods are only means to achieve freedoms, which are the real ends of development. 
The beneficiaries of damage compensations are mostly developing countries, by and 
large characterized by lower levels of social and institutional capacity of turning 
resources like primary goods into freedoms, i.e. into valuable beings and doings. This is 
the reason why I prefer to root the allocation of damage compensations in a ranking 
based on functionings (ends), rather then in one referred to the simple basis of goods 
and services (means). 
4. So what? 
To conclude, what does the normative framework put forward suggest? 
When looking for a just initial distribution of endowments the criterion of differentiated 
equality demands a rule that can take into account the ‘net’ actual consumptions of 
GHG emitting energy services. In other words, this rule should be neutral respect of the 
most striking undeserved inequalities, such as energy needs caused by weather 
conditions, use of renewables and availability of sinks. This perspective envisions an 
initial distribution of pollution rights relying on some form of ‘cardinalization’ of a 
Borda ranking of countries, where the Borda ordering elements other than population 
can be per capita (i.e. weighted by population): heating needs, cooling needs, carbon 
intensity of energy use, forested area (all data easily available). A problem remains in 
the ‘cardinalization’ of the Borda ranking. A prima facie solution, not scientifically 
significant but with all the strength of objectivity, may be to make the initial distribution 
of endowments proportional to the Borda sum which determines the relevant Borda 
ranking. 
In the international climate policy arena the Pareto-optimality criterion implies, as far as 
subsequent exchanges of endowments are concerned, that swaps of emissions rights 
take place till the reach of a global allocation where costs for the last avoided unit of 
GHG, i.e. marginal abatement costs, are equal in all countries. This in turn entails that 
there should be quite a substantial trade of rights from industrialized countries with 
higher marginal abatement costs, to developing countries with lower marginal 
abatement costs. In fact, in the North the marginal return of controlling GHG cutbacks 
has dramatically decreased, while its costs have substantially increased. Developed 
countries are now working on the steepest segment of the curve of GHG abatement 
marginal costs. Hence, giving to the South a greater share of emissions’ rights, is by any 
means efficient, since developing countries are still on a low and not very steep segment 
of the curve. But this state, if justified by Pareto-efficiency, requires monetary 
compensation making no party prefer the emissions’ right and compensation payments 
of the others, in order to be envy-free. Furthermore, this desired Pareto-efficient, envy-  16
free distribution should maintain every parties’ utility between the original level of the 
just initial state (lowest bound) and the lone-party-gains all one (highest bound). In 
order to achieve such a just final allocation, in the practical terms of international 
climate policy, it is necessary that parties that should undertake the majority of GHG 
cutbacks for efficiency reasons (developing countries) be fully compensated by parties 
where marginal abatement cost are inefficiently high (developed countries). This 
solution is the only one that can in principle be both Pareto-efficient and envy-free. At 
the same time it can assure that neither parties (the South and the North) would be 
worse off than in the just original situation, nor better off than in the hypothetical stand-
alone situation. 
The financing of adaptation and damage compensation activities is straightforward. The 
criterion of responsibility based on historical accountability, purported by Rawls’ 
egalitarian principle, claims evidently for a burden sharing pattern proportional to 
cumulative emissions or to current concentrations
22. 
Damage compensation is an issue by and large neglected in actual climate change 
negotiations, but it is going to play a major role in future agreements, being this topic a 
priority in developing countries’ agenda. My point is that justice and equity concerns 
raised by the allocation of compensations for climate related damages be rooted in Sen’s 
capability approach. Specifically, they should be carried out proportionally to the level 
of some properly selected achieved functionings: the less the overall level of these 
achieved functionings, the more damage compensations are due. Actually, the 
beneficiaries of damage compensations are mostly developing countries, with lower 
levels of social and institutional capacities of turning resources into freedoms. Hence it 
seems preferable to ground the consequent compensations in a ranking based on 
functionings which encompass also the ability of converting resources into valuable 
doings and beings, rather than in one that refers only to the basis of goods and services. 
In practical terms it is possible to refer to the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI). 
The HDI is a summary measure of human development, obtained averaging the indices 
of three basic functionings. They are: ‘being able to live a long and healthy life’, as 
measured by life expectancy at birth, ‘being able to have an adequate level of 
knowledge’, as measured by adult literacy rate and gross enrolment ratio, and ‘being 
able to have a decent standard of living’, as measured by per capita GDP in PPP US$. 
Though its apparent simplicity and its somehow crude use of the notion of functionings, 
the HDI has had a notable impact on policy-making and it is still the most known 
operationalization of the capability approach. With normalization of the indices of 
functionings, the HDI value ranges from 0 to 1, being 1 the maximum possible value. 
The difference between the value achieved by a country and 1 measures its lack of 
capabilities. Therefore the wider this difference, the lower the ability to deal with 
climate-related damages and the greater should proportionally be the share of damage 
compensation. 
                                                  
22 According to the Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) version 1.5. (Washington, DC: World Resources 
Institute, 2003, available at: http://cait.wri.org.) the two distributions have the highest possible level of correlation 
(1.00). Actually among the ten highest ranking countries in cumulative emissions, only two, Germany and France, 
show a slight difference (- 1) in current concentrations ranking.   17
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